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RECENT CASES
Appeal and Error-Appeal from the Juvenile Court. After a husband and wife had
instituted adoption proceedings in the juvenile court for a child in custody of that court,
the father of the child petitioned the court for custody of the child. The juvenile court
dismissed the petition. Appeal. Held: Dismissed. In re a Minor, 39 Wn. 2d 744, 238 P.
2d 914 (1951).
The order from which the appeal was taken was an oral opinion later repeated in a
memorandum decision. Neither an oral opinion nor a memorandum decision of a
superior court is an appealable order. Edward L. Eyre & Co. v. Hirsch, 36 Wn. 2d
439, 218 P. 2d 888 (1950). Although the Court could have based its decision on this
ground, it chose to rest its holding on the broader ground that the juvenile court law
does not provide for an appeal. State ex rel. Gray v. Webster, 122 Wash. 526, 211 Pac.
274 (1922).
The rule that no appeal may be taken from the juvenile court seems to be well
settled, notwithstanding the broad provisions of Rule on Appeal 14, 34A Wn. 2d 20,
which reads, "Any party aggrieved may appeal to the supreme court in the mode pre-
scribed in these rules from any and every of the following determinations, and no
others, made by the superior court, or the judge thereof, in any action or proceeding:
(1) from the final judgment entered in any action or proceeding. . . ." It could be
argued that an appeal from the juvenile court should be allowed under the broad lan-
guage of this rule; but, all the decisions (with the exception of Fuhrman v. Arvin,
21 Wn. 2d 828, 153 P. 2d 165 (1944), where counsel failed to raise the point) have
been to the contrary. See In re King, 39 Wn. 2d 875, 239 P. 2d 553 (1952).
No future harm can result to parties to juvenile court proceedings from the opera-
tion of the rule denying appeal to the Supreme Court as the proceedings of the juvenile
court are, nevertheless, subject to review. The Court indicates, with a plethora of
citations, that a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, or prohibition may be used for this
purpose in a proper case.
ELDO N C. PARR
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Religion-Chest X-Ray as a Condition of Admis-
sion to State University. The Board of Regents of the University of Washington re-
quired that each student submit to a chest X-Ray examination for the purpose of dis-
closing tubercular infection. P, a Christian Scientist, sought to register for her senior
year, and when she refused to submit to the examination she was denied admission.
She then petitioned to the Regents for an exemption on the ground that to submit
would violate her religious convictions. The petition was denied, and P now seeks a
writ of mandamus to compel the Regents to admit her without requiring the X-Ray
examination, contending, inter alia, that the requirement was an unjustified abridge-
ment of her religious liberty as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. The
trial court denied the writ. Held: Affirmed. To admit P (and others claiming a simi-
lar exemption) to the University without taking the required X-Ray examination
presents a clear and present danger of an evil which the state may lawfully prevent,
and justifies the restrictions on her religious freedom. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Arm-
strong, 139 Wash. Dec. 795, 239 P. 2d 545 (1952).
The free exercise of religion is protected from state interference by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
In addition the constitution of the state of Washington provides a similar guarantee.
WASH. CONST. ART. I, § 11 and AMEND. 4. This right is not absolute and must occa-
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sionally be restricted for the public good, but it is so fundamental that it may be
inhibited only when the particular conduct involved presents a clear and present danger
of an evil which the state may lawfully prevent. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. The
protection of civil liberties by the Fourteenth Amendment is designed in part to protect
minority groups from the legislative majority, and the "clear and present danger" test
would seem to be one for the courts and not the legislature. Antieau, Religious Liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 No= DAME LAwYm 271 (1947).
While the rules relating to freedom of religion and the "clear and present danger"
test are accurately stated in the instant case, it is submitted that the constitutional
question of religious freedom was not presented by the facts, and that the application
of the test to justify the chest X-Ray requirement was unnecessary. No one has an
absolute right to attend a state-supported university, and the legislature may impose
conditions on the right of admission. University of Mississippi v. Waugh, 237 U.S.
589 (1915). The state's power to impose conditions on admission is not- unlimited, how-
ever, and admission requirements which deny prospective students the equal protection
of the laws are invalid. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Camda, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)
(racial discrimination). Requirements which openly discriminate against certain
classes of persons are clearly beyond the power of the state. A regulation which is
uniform on its face but secretly intended to be discriminatory would also violate the
equal protection clause. For example, the regents might require all students at the
university to eat meat every day of the week including Friday, ostensibly to improve
their diet. While such a rule would be of uniform application, the intent to discriminate
against Catholics would be readily apparent. However, in the instant case such hidden
discrimination is not present, because the purpose of the X-Ray requirement is clearly
to discover tuberculosis, and not to exclude Christian Scientists. The mere fact that an
unequal burden is imposed by a law, fair on its face, is not sufficient to invalidate the
law. See Cotting v. Goddard, 183 U.S. 79 (1936).
Persons seeking entrance to a university are not compelled to do acts which are
prescribed as conditions of admission because no one is required to attend a state uni-
versity. Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (military train-
ing). This factor distinguishes cases where the requirement of the flag salute of all
students in grade school was held to violate freedom of speech. West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; State ex rel. Bolling v. Superior
Court, 16 Wn. 2d 373, 133 P. 2d 803 (1943). As primary education was compulsory in
both of these cases the students were in a true sense compelled to perform the required
flag salute. Such compulsion is wanting when admission 'requirements are imposed by
a university, because a person unwilling to submit to the conditions of entrance may
choose not to attend. He has only a conditional right of admission, and his constitu-
tional rights are not infringed when the regents require acts which the applicant is
unwilling to perform for religious reasons. Hamilton v. University of California, supra.
The Regents at the University of Washington are vested with ". . . full control of
the university.. .," RCW 28.77.130 [RRS § 4557], and under this general grant they
have all powers fairly or necessarily implied to effect the objects and purposes of the
institution. Juntila v. Everett School District No. 24, 178 Wash. 637, 35 P. 2d 78
(1934). However, regulations imposed by the university administration under these
powers must be reasonable. Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W. 2d 805 (1932).
Therefore, if the requirement of an X-Ray examination is within the Regents' power,
an inquiry into the reasonableness of the condition should conclude the matter since
P has only a conditional right of admission and is not compelled to attend. The con-
stitutional right of free exercise of religion and the "clear and present danger" test
would not be involved at all.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Testing the case by this analysis, may the Regents impose health regulations, and
is the X-Ray requirement reasonable? The protection of students from contagious dis-
eases while attending the University is of primary importance, and when dealing with
an insidious disease such as tuberculosis the Regents, having "full control of the uni-
versity," should have ample authority to protect students from possible exposure.
Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 138 Pac. 937 (1913) (vaccination). A blanket
requirement of an X-Ray examination seems an effective and reasonable method of
discovering infected persons, so that they may be prevented from exposing other stu-
dents to the disease. The dissenting opinion argues that the potential exemption of two
hundred students per year on religious grounds would not present a very serious
problem, because present incidence of undiscovered tuberculosis at the University indi-
cates that this exemption, if granted, would result in only one undiscovered case every
seven and one-half years being concealed within the ranks of the religiously exempt.
While the argument is appealing at first blush, it overlooks the fact that one of the
most probable reasons for the falling incidence of tuberculosis at the University is that
all students are examined, and that to exempt some students would tend to increase
the chances that students would be exposed to the disease. Thus if the requirement is a
reasonable one, the Court's decision in the instant case was correct, although based on
an unnecessary application of the "clear and present danger" test.
GoRDON F. CRANDALL
Statute of Frauds-Real Estate Brokers' Contracts-Agency. P orally engaged D to
sell P's land, for which D was to receive a commission of $1,000. D falsely repre-
sented that he had procured a purchaser who would buy the property if he could
obtain a loan of $10,000, and that D could procure the necessary loan upon paying a
bonus of $3,000 to the lender. P, in reliance on these representations, entered a written
agreement to pay D $4,000. P brought an action to recover the $3,000 which D had
received and converted to his own use. Held: The oral agreement created an agency
relationship which D breached by his misrepresentations, and RCW 19.36.010 (5)
[RRS § 5825(5)], which provides that "An agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or commission" shall
be void unless in writing, is not applicable since it refers only to agreements for the
payment of a commission, and does not require that the actual authority to sell or
purchase be in writing. Mele v. Cerenzie, 140 Wash. Dec. 115, 241 P. 2d 669 (1952).
There is ample authority in Washington for the proposition that the agency to
sell or purchase on the one hand, and an agreement to pay a real estate broker's com-
mission on the other, are separate and distinct, and that it is only the latter which is
required by the statute to be in writing. Stewart v. Preston, 77 Wash. 559, 137 Pac.
993 (1914); Ewing and Clark v. Mionford, 157 Wash. 617, 289 Pac. 1026 (1930);
Pederson v. Jones, 35 Wn. 2d 180, 211 P. 2d 705 (1949). In the Pederson case,
the broker, employed to purchase land for his principal, bought the land himself
at a lower price, and then resold it to the principal at a profit. The court held that
the broker could not avoid liability for his fraud by the plea that his agency was not in
writing. However, in an earlier Washington case, the orally employed broker had
purchased land in his own name with his own funds and later had sold it to a third
party at a profit, and the court held that no constructive trust could be placed upon the
proceeds of the sale in the broker's hands, on the basis, in part, that under RCW
19.36.010 (5) [RRS § 5825(5)], an agreement employing an agent or broker to sell
or purchase real estate for compensation is void unless in writing. Therefore, the rela-
tionship of principal and agent did not exist. Carkonen v. Alberts, 196 Wash. 575, 83
P. 2d 900 (1938). In a comment on the case in 14 WAsH. L. REV. 210 (1939), the
